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On May 20, 2018, the New York Times published “Unsheltered,” an article series detailing the 
ways that New York City landlords abuse the housing court system, one of  the busiest courts in 
the United States with 69,000 cases a year, in order to evict tenants from the apartments they 
called home (Barker et al. 2018). Capitalizing on the highly profitable housing market in New 
York City, after evicting the previous occupants, the landlords then renovate these apartments 
and charge hugely inflated rents to higher-earning tenants. The previous occupants are at best 
forced to leave their present neighborhoods for another, to leave for another state, or at worst, 
are made homeless. Such actions, sometimes carried out blocks at a time on behalf  of  large 
corporations like the Orbach Group, Thor Equities, or any number of  multi-million dollar 
corporations, consequently carry out the large-scale uprooting of  not only specific individuals, 
but often entire communities that had once called those neighborhoods home. 
   Such stories of  precarious housing, as most of  us are likely aware, are not limited to the 
highly lucrative real estate market of  New York City, nor even to low-income tenants, though 
they have been and continue to be the most vulnerable. In 2016, across the United States, there 
were 2.3 million evictions filed, no doubt in part because the median asking rent between 1995 
and today has increased by seventy percent, adjusted for inflation (Gross 2018). Similarly, the 
rates of  home-ownership have sharply declined for millennials across the West: The Guardian, 
for example, reports that in the UK half  as many millennials (twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-
olds) compared to baby boomers will own their own house by age thirty (Savage 2018), and 
the Huffington Post reports that home-ownership in Canada is at an all-time low due to rapidly 
increasing housing prices coupled with relatively stagnant wage growth (Tencer 2017). Personal 
ownership of  one’s housing, it seems, is becoming a luxury and not a necessity, and is becoming 
an increasingly unlikely one for those who do not have the means to afford down-payments 
or finance mortgages on increasingly inflated property prices. Such precariousness, I plan to 
demonstrate here, is precipitated and even made possible by a certain tacit (though sometimes 
overt) understanding of  what housing is, specifically, the notion that housing is not a funda-
mental condition of  human life related to our being “at home” in the world, but a commodity 
to be bought and sold on the free market, “real estate” or, as is increasingly common, a major 
financial “investment.”1 This latter understanding of  housing as investment is certainly at play 
     1 This understanding, in particular, being the one that led to the subprime mortgage crisis of  2007-2008, which 
essentially treated individual home-ownership as a secondary concern to capital accumulation, insofar as the 
banks, and not the homeowners, were given massive bail-outs. It also denotes just how fundamental the value of  
real-estate is to our contemporary economy.
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for real estate corporations, but is also operative at the level of  many middle-class home owners 
who treat their property as their biggest financial asset, which they can use as collateral for their 
children’s student loans or sell to fund their eventual retirement. It is my contention here that 
this understanding of  housing as commodity and investment is complicit in creating a world 
where fewer and fewer people have adequate housing in the very concrete sense of  having a 
shelter that will guarantee a minimal level of  stability for the foreseeable future; furthermore, 
that the lack of  such housing and the way its distribution is organized forecloses the more gen-
eral possibility of  feeling situated or “feeling at home” in the world at all.
     Whether or not we want to entertain his conclusions in the face of  such facts, I believe 
Heidegger’s critical question during the post-WWII housing crisis in Germany – “what is the 
state of  dwelling in our precarious age?” – remains timely (2001, 158). This question has cer-
tainly sparked debate within academic circles of  philosophy, but has unfortunately not yet 
become a fundamental question at either the level of  everyday conversation or public policy. 
For Heidegger, the impetus for his reflections was the shortage of  housing after much of  the 
housing stock was destroyed after the war, but for us, there is no such housing shortage. Indeed, 
in both the United States and Europe, the number of  vacant houses largely outnumbers the 
number of  homeless individuals, indicating the absurd situation where a vacant house is more 
desirable, for the company or individual who owns it, than one occupied by the wrong people 
or for the wrong price.
     To be at home is to be situated, to know one’s surroundings and what to expect, whereas 
one’s “housing” is an individual (or intimate/familial) space which filters and orients one’s 
engagements with the world. When housing is precarious, we might call it a mere “shelter,” a 
temporary space in which you can rest, but which is essentially temporary. The Odyssey, interest-
ingly enough, demonstrates all three modes of  inhabitation: from “home,” Ithaca itself  where 
Odysseus’ family and wealth are, to Calypso’s island which afforded comfort and stability, but 
not “home,” to the hole Odysseus covers with leaves on the island of  Phaeacia, which offers 
only a minimal shelter from the elements after he washes up on shore. It is therefore my goal 
here to consider the experience of  being at home with a critical consideration of  such issues of  
precarious housing and to demonstrate, drawing upon and moving beyond the reflections of  
Gaston Bachelard and Martin Heidegger, how what is at stake in such situations of  precarious 
housing might be a more radical problem than a failure of  distributive justice.
      I will argue that such precariousness, suffered by specific individuals, communities, or young-
er generations, denotes a more general foreclosure of  the very possibility of  feeling at home in 
the world. To this effect, I will consider various descriptions of  loss of  housing and feeling out 
of  place or unwelcome, together with a careful analysis of  the phenomenological descriptions 
of  dwelling and home. I will claim there are at least two interconnected but distinct aspects of  
feeling at home: first, the continuity or stability offered by permanent housing, and second, of  
our being situated (and therefore situating the occupant) in a wider social context and “feeling at 
home” within it. In the contemporary world, the possibilities of  both permanent housing and 
the durable sense of  home it enables are increasingly being occluded by an understanding of  
housing as an increasingly lucrative commodity and capital asset. 
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I. 
SOLITUDE, CONTINUITY, AND THE FAILURES OF THE WELFARE STATE 
We begin to address how issues of  shelter and the moral and existential stakes of  these issues 
are thrown into relief  by first considering the task that Bachelard in The Poetics of  Space (1994) 
sets himself. He writes: 
I must show that the house is one of  the greatest powers of  integration for the 
thoughts, memories, and dreams of  mankind . . . In the life of  man, the house 
thrusts aside contingencies, its councils of  continuity are unceasing. Without it, 
man would be a dispersed being. It maintains him through the storms of  the 
heavens and through those of  life. (6-7) 
Bachelard understands this to be a challenge to Henri Bergson’s metaphysics of  time, where 
time is essentially duration [durée], the continuous and indeterminate flow of  time that, if  de-
scribed as a specific moment or instant, would no longer constitute “duration,” but rather a fro-
zen image of  time; that is, the geometrical tracing of  the movement of  a hand through space, 
rather than the hand in motion, which never occupies its entire trajectory at a given time. This 
is crucially important to note because Bachelard’s approach, which he calls “topoanalysis,” 
rests upon the claim that “[t]he finest specimens of  fossilized duration concretized as a result 
of  long sojourn, are to be found in and through space” (9). Such moments of  fossilized time 
matter, but they matter only on the condition of  having a space in which they can take shape. 
Our memories need spaces to “hook on to,”  and even if  we have since left them, these places 
often come back to us through dreams or when we move through similar spaces.2 If  time re-
quires space to fossilize, then our having a place in the house becomes a crucial phenomenon 
that contributes to the depth and fullness of  human life.   
     Further elaborating on this point, Bachelard then claims that to form indelible memories 
we require solitude and solitude is always achieved in specific places: corners, garret rooms, 
crawlspaces, and attics. These are the places that children have moments to themselves, are 
able to cultivate a personality, coiling in upon themselves like a shell, and discover their own 
interiority.3 To be sure, there is good reason to argue that solitude is never sufficient for a 
sense of  complete subjectivity or interiority, as so many authors make clear,  but Bachelard is 
nevertheless correct in saying that “all the spaces of  our past moments of  solitude, the spaces 
in which we have suffered from solitude, enjoyed, desired and compromised solitude, remain 
indelible within us, and precisely because the human being wants them to remain so” (1994, 
     2 There are two further places we might look to support this thesis: in Deleuze & Guattari’s What is Philosophy? 
they discuss the idea of  art as a “monument” of  compressed time (1994, 167). Janet Donohoe, in Remembering 
Places: A Phenomenological Study of  the Relationship Between Memory and Place (2014), studies at length the way that spaces 
ground not only memory, but also a sense of  connectedness to culture and tradition.
     3 Emmanuel Levinas, too, uses this imagery of  “coiling” to describe subjectivity and its relationship to its envi-
ronment in Totality and Infinity (1969, 118).
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10).4 Bachelard understands this psychoanalytically: the spaces of  the attic, the crawlspace, etc., 
all form powerful affective images that shape us, and thereby accrue specific affective valences. 
No matter what later might come to pass, we will always have been the child who retreated to 
that attic, who daydreamed in the quiet spaces of  the home. We carry our intimate spaces of  
childhood with us through such indelible images, and because they are indelible, such images 
assist in giving us a sense of  continuity: they anchor us to the world. For the purposes of  this 
paper, we should further emphasize how moments of  solitude, of  retreating into a familiar and 
comfortable space, is also a way to gather our energy, to rest. Thus, those who are not afforded 
the possibility of  having such spaces are at the same time not afforded the possibility of  soli-
tude, and on Bachelard’s account, would not as easily be able to form the indelible images that 
ground us in the world and maintain us through the world’s variability and challenges. To use 
Bachelard’s own vocabulary, instability in our dwelling spaces risks making a human being a 
“dispersed being,” although he quickly passes over this possibility of  dispersion as essentially 
secondary insofar as all being is immediately well being. It is, he writes, “already a value. Life be-
gins well, it begins enclosed, protected, all warm in the bosom of  the house” (7). Unfortunately, 
from the outset our homes can be places of  violence, uncertainty, and contestation, often in 
ways we might even overlook (as we will see in our treatment of  the administration of  welfare 
below). Bachelard’s metaphysical reorientation from Heidegger, in other words, overlooks pre-
cisely the “thrownness” and contingency involved in the relative stability or instability of  one’s 
childhood home, and in so doing, overlooks the contingent and political factors that must be 
interrogated in any account of  dwelling. 
     We ought to expand Bachelard’s point here by saying that the home is more than just an 
anchor for our memories and a sense of  depth or subjectivity, but also serves as a pre-condi-
tion for a full participation in democratic political life. Kirsten Jacobson, in her article, “The 
Experience of  Home and the Space of  Citizenship” (2010), makes precisely this point, arguing 
that our existence as civic individuals is made possible by the intimate, interpersonal anchor 
of  the home. Therefore, Jacobson argues, entertaining the liberal idea that we are all isolated 
individuals is only possible if  we take for granted the intersubjective undergirding that fosters 
the growth of  such isolatable individuals. If  a liberal society ignores this precondition, Jacob-
son argues, it risks “the possibility for gross mistreatment of  the very citizens it is attempting to 
describe and cultivate” (245).
     I can think of  no more revealing example of  such mistreatment (though there are certainly 
more sinister or devastating ones) than the way welfare is administered in the United States. 
Welfare, at least ostensibly, is meant to guarantee the basic conditions its citizens require to 
live in a given society, which often (rightly) include providing access to affordable or subsidized 
housing. In Justice and the Politics of  Difference (1990), however, Iris Marion Young argues that 
while welfare might be a good thing, and it might be an important step to guarantee such basic 
conditions, it nevertheless exercises a form of  oppression. There are two crucial flaws in the 
welfare system on her account: first, it deprives those dependent upon it of  certain rights and 
freedoms that others possess, and secondly, it blocks forms of  respect and a feeling of  social 
usefulness (itself  a precondition of  feeling at home, but one which lies beyond the scope of  this 
paper) due to the stigma attached to receiving welfare benefits. In support of  the first claim, 
she writes:
     4 In Totality and Infinity (1969), for example, Levinas’ goal is to show the ultimate insufficiency of the coiling-in of 
subjectivity upon itself. Similarly, Maurice Merleau-Ponty consistently emphasizes throughout his work how the 
individual is always imbricated within an “anonymous,” “general,” and “pre-personal” world of intersubjectivity. 
Interestingly, Bachelard himself claims that it is through returning to the images of home through sleep that “we 
may perhaps experience a type of repose that is pre-human; pre-human, in this case, approaching the immemo-
rial” (1994, 10). 
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In meeting needs of  the marginalized, often with the aid of  social scientific 
disciplines, welfare agencies also construct the needs themselves. Medical and 
social service professionals know what is good for those they serve, and the 
marginals [sic] and dependents themselves do not have the right to claim to 
know what is good for them. (54)
Due to the highly bureaucratized nature of  how welfare benefits are administered, the recipi-
ents of  such benefits must often subject themselves to authorities with which most of  us do not 
have to concern ourselves. Such authorities place limits on what kinds of  food can be purchased 
with food stamps, or require that the beneficiaries of  welfare constantly prove that they are at 
the same time employed or actively looking for further employment. Even more pointedly, the 
beneficiaries of  public housing are often subjected to stringent security measures. In City of  
Quartz (1990), for example, Mike Davis describes the Imperial Courts Housing Project in Los 
Angeles, which “has . . . been fortified with fencing, obligatory identity passes and a substation 
of  the LAPD,” and where “[v]isitors are stopped and frisked, while the police routinely order 
residents back into their apartments at night” (244). To accept welfare, therefore, means to 
abdicate our decision-making powers in specific areas of  our life, even as it guarantees that we 
can meet our material needs. 
     In such a situation, the demands of  a rational bureaucracy begin to intrude on the intimate 
space of  the home. This consequence of  the structure of  welfare benefits transgresses the affec-
tive qualities of  home that both Bachelard and Jacobson reveal to us: if  it is only on the basis of  
the intimate continuity and stability of  the home that we can then participate fully in the world, 
then the constant bureaucratic demands of  the welfare state undermine the continuity required 
by what it aims to guarantee. We may house those who are lucky enough to receive welfare 
benefits (after negotiating the paperwork requirements), but do we therefore guarantee them 
a home? Bachelard implicitly illustrates the difficulty here when he writes: “How often have I 
wished for the attic of  my boredom when the complications of  life made me lose the very germ 
of  all freedom!” (1994, 16-7). Often stretched thin by an increasingly demanding pace of  life, 
we seek comfort in familiar spaces, but the way welfare is administered makes the human space 
of  retreat and solitude one of  the most pressing and complicated affairs in an already compli-
cated life as it makes the intimate space that is supposed to protect and enable us to struggle in 
the world yet another place of  struggle. There is therefore a fundamental discontinuity built into 
the structure of  welfare provisions for housing, which undermines the continuity required for 
such housing to be a full “home” in a Bachelardian sense.  
     As human beings, we need moments of  solitude and retreat, we require a private space 
to call our own; we need a space where, even if  the walls are porous, even if  we can hear the 
neighbors fighting or the traffic on the street, we feel as if  we can relax and forget the concerns 
of  the outside world. The human being is “a being who does not want to melt away, and who, 
even in the past, when [s]he sets out in search of  things past, wants time to ‘suspend’ its flight” 
(1994, 8). Without such a basic structure in which to house ourselves, without our nooks and 
corners, we are at the mercy of  time, caught up wholly in the “duration” of  our immediate 
needs and actions, and we lack a place to gather ourselves before setting out into the world, as 
citizens, as workers, or even as fully formed subjects.  
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II. 
THE SITUATEDNESS OF HOME: DWELLING 
We ought to admit, however, the limitations of  Bachelard’s analysis. For Bachelard, the para-
digmatic home seems to be a rural French house, to the point where he claims that city living 
pales in comparison insofar as it lacks both verticality and cosmicity, a relationship between the 
house and its natural surroundings. In fact, Bachelard is generally unaware of  the specificity of  
his own idiosyncratic experience of  home, claiming, for example: 
From my viewpoint, from the phenomenologist’s viewpoint, the conscious 
metaphysics that starts from the moment when the being is ‘cast into the world’ 
is a secondary metaphysics. It passes over the preliminaries, when being is be-
ing-well, when the human being is deposited in a being-well, in the well-being 
originally associated with being. (1994, 7)
Substituting “my” with “the phenomenologist’s” viewpoint is an all too common slight of  
hand in the phenomenological tradition. Indeed, Bachelard’s hostility towards the idea 
that human experience involves any measure of  being “cast into the world” indicates a 
discomfort, on his part, with the variability that can occur in our situations of  home: our 
homes can be precarious, or even places of  downright hostility. Bachelard, as comfort-
ably housed, suggests that on an ontological level, the most primordial being is well-being. 
Speaking from a very different worldly position, namely, as a Chicana lesbian, Gloria Anz-
aldúa, in Borderlands/La Frontera (1987) provides a starkly different description of  the world: 
The world is not a safe place to live in. We shiver in separate cells in enclosed 
cities, shoulders hunched, barely keeping the panic below the surface of  the 
skin, daily drinking shock along with our morning coffee, fearing the torches 
being set to our buildings, the attacks in the streets. Shutting down. Woman 
does not feel safe when her own culture, and white culture, are critical of  her; 
when the males of  all races hunt her as prey. (20)
Indeed, Anzaldúa goes on to mention a heterosexual student who believed that homophobia 
meant fear of  going home, which prompts Anzaldúa to think to herself, “how apt. Fear of  going 
home. And of  not being taken in. We’re afraid of  being abandoned by the mother, the culture, 
la Raza, for being unacceptable, faulty, damaged” (20). If  we are attempting to describe phe-
nomenologically the experience of  being a human, we absolutely must include a description of  
being-at-home, and Bachelard contributes greatly to this discussion. That being said, Anzaldúa 
points us towards the necessity of  being critical of  our descriptions of  such experiences insofar 
as they might overlook the determinate historical or political conditions that make this or that 
experience possible, in this case, insofar as we must make our homes within a cultural milieu 
that makes them more or less sheltering, more or less homely. For Bachelard, it might very well 
have been the case that the home was a good home, and that it perfectly served him as place to 
cultivate the habits and memories that undergird his fuller participation in the world. Not ev-
eryone, however, would write that in the experience of  home, “[i]t is as though in this material 
paradise, the human being were bathed in nourishment, as though [s]he were gratified with all 
the essential benefits” (1994, 7). In Anzaldúa’s example, the systematic targeting of  women of  
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color and identifiable queer people in society at large never quite dissipates, even in the intima-
cy of  home. Even if  such forces were not motivated enough to destroy the home itself, facing 
violence and harassment on the street can be enough to make even a well-built house with a 
loving family take on the valence of  a prison. All human beings need solitude, they need spaces 
to dream in, to be sheltered in, but we are not like the hermit crab: we do not carry our homes 
on our back, we do not always carry with us the possibility for solitude and retreat, but rather, 
our homes are situated in neighborhoods, in cities, in nations, in cultures. 
     Thus far, we have focused primarily on the lack or precarity of  “shelter,” but Anzaldúa’s 
unromantic and precarious description of  home points us to the necessity of  interrogating the 
way the physical space of  the shelter is situated within a wider social context. Despite her radi-
cally different perspective than Heidegger, they would seem to be in agreement upon this point, 
as “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” begins with a consideration of  how feeling at home (which 
he calls “dwelling”) cannot simply be reduced to a mere shelter. Heidegger brings up the ex-
ample of  saying “[t]he truck driver is at home on the highway, but he does not have his shelter 
there; the working woman is at home in the spinning mill, but does not have her dwelling place 
there; the chief  engineer is at home in the power station, but he does not dwell there” (2001, 
143-4). Such people feel at home in these places because they have the habits and practices 
that correspond to them, they feel in sync with such places. These examples are, however, gen-
dered, which brings us to the further consideration that certain groups of  people are capable 
or incapable of  feeling at home in certain structures, contexts, or situations. Shannon Sullivan, 
in Revealing Whiteness (2006) for example, claims that one of  the important phenomenological 
aspects of  being white is what she calls “ontological expansiveness,” the implicit assumption 
that all spaces are or could be inhabited (10). A white person, in other words, could in principle 
imagine themselves being at home anywhere, whereas a non-white person might be limited 
in the spaces they can occupy, and might feel that limitation even in imagining possible places 
they might want to feel at home. That being said, Heidegger’s goal here is to say that building 
a road, a spinning mill, or a power station would also be indicative of  what he calls “dwelling,” 
insofar as “building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling—to build is in itself  al-
ready to dwell” (2001, 144, italics added). We build, we might say, because we dwell, and dwell in 
the sense of  “a staying with things” (149). If  we substitute our previous use of  “feeling at home” 
with “dwelling,” we gain the crucially important temporal dimension to our inhabitation of  the 
home: to be at home means to dwell there, to stay for the foreseeable future. 
     We dwell insofar as we are the beings that are capable of  seizing time and of  clearing a 
space for things to be seen, whether those things be monuments, infrastructure, or a house. A 
bridge, to use Heidegger’s example, shows us the earth, the sky, and the comings and goings 
of  the people who use it; the bridge reveals a “place” to which we human beings are somehow 
attuned. Such an example, however, must lead us to ask the further critical question as to who 
gets to cross this bridge, or perhaps, who resides under it, as a minimal shelter from the elements, 
while others pass above. Our buildings might all generate spaces, might all indicate an essen-
tial and primordial “dwelling” of  our being upon the earth, but such spaces are determinate, 
and as such, are differentially experienced by different people. The new shopping plaza might 
become a space for young professionals to spend money at shops catered to their tastes, but 
for those who were evicted from their homes for its construction, for the business owners who 
once catered to a community that has been displaced, its boutique shopping might announce 
only the harsh absence of  what once was reflected in the space in which they no longer belong.5 
     5 I am thinking here of  the story of  Brooklyn’s Fulton Mall discussed at some length in The Brooklyn Wars by Neil 
deMause (2016, 213-270). 
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     I am interrogating Heidegger here not so much to advance his thesis in “Building, Dwell-
ing, Thinking,” but rather as a starting point to indicate the ways in which housing or shelter 
is caught up in a wider context of  what we might call “dwelling” or “belonging.” To be sure, 
part of  what it means to have shelter is that, even if  the walls of  our given shelters are porous, 
letting the elements and the comings and goings of  other people in, they mark out a space 
that is our own, they allow something special to happen, which allows us a crucial distance from 
other people and the elements. As Heidegger teaches us, however, this is caught up in a wider 
context: dwelling opens up onto a world we “inhabit,” forming the habitual modes of  interac-
tion that make us feel at home in a space, and from this anchoring space of  belonging, we can 
then venture out into the world. Such spaces form the nexus of  our “orientation” towards the 
world by supplying a “here” to get to “there.”6 Moreover, Heidegger’s focus on spaces that are 
not simply dwelling spaces seems to me to be crucial: the structures beyond the home through 
which we move, which we share with the people who share our world, which form part of  our 
“neighborhood,” so to speak, are just as much implicated in our sense of  belonging. Imagine, 
for example, if  suddenly the bridge we take to work were closed, if  our neighbors were forced 
out of  our neighborhood and replaced with strangers: such moments, though not specifically 
targeting our own specific dwelling or “house,” nevertheless threaten our sense of  dwelling. We 
are thrown back onto our situation instead of  fully inhabiting it. 
     While Heidegger stresses dwelling as a fundamental fact about humans, namely, that to be 
human is to dwell, given our previous considerations about the precariousness of  housing, we 
should be wary of  taking this to mean that all human beings always feel as if  they belong in the 
world. Heidegger himself  mentions those who have experienced a “loss of  rapport with things 
that occurs in states of  depression,” which “would be wholly impossible if  even such a state 
were not still what it is as a human state: that is, a staying with things” (155, italics in original). 
Feeling a loss of  rapport with the world, in other words, is still a mode of  being with the world: 
only the kind of  being that expects or feels as if  they ought to belong can feel its lack.7  But 
depression is not the only form of  losing such a rapport, and indeed, it is becoming more and 
more clear that the political organization of  who gets to dwell merits attention. We should not, 
in other words, treat dwelling as if  it were simply a fact about being human, but as something 
that requires, to use Heidegger’s own terminology, “work,” albeit the explicitly political kind of  
work that Heidegger is so reticent to mention. Indeed, a large part of  the “crisis” of  dwelling 
that Heidegger diagnoses is itself  the result of  Germany’s instigation of  the Second World War, 
which resulted in the destruction of  many of  the cities in Germany and their venerable housing 
stock by allied bombing. Heidegger’s ignorance of  this fact, and his treatment of  “dwelling” 
as a primarily metaphysical problem, demonstrate precisely how any proper understanding of  
dwelling must contend with its historical and political conditions.8   
     Throughout “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Heidegger repeatedly tries to reverse the 
seemingly obvious priority between building and dwelling. We do not first build a shelter, and 
then dwell within it, but it is precisely because we are the kinds of  beings that dwell that we 
build anything at all. But this primordial sense of  dwelling in the context of  contending with 
a housing crisis goes too far. It presumes, as Sullivan’s concept of  “ontological expansiveness” 
describes, a subject who could potentially occupy all spaces (or indeed, one who already does): 
whose “belonging” is a necessary consequence or property of  their being at all, “for when I 
      
      
     6 For more on orientation, and specifically how it relates to sexual orientation and others, see Sara Ahmed’s Queer 
Phenomenology (2006). Indeed, much of  my emphasis on the limitations of  the phenomenological descriptions of  
Bachelard and Heidegger is inspired by her approach to Husserl in this text.
     7 See the work of  Matthew Ratcliffe on how this characterizes the phenomenon of  depression, particularly, “The 
Interpersonal Structure of  Depression” (2018).
     8 For more on this point, see W.G. Sebald’s On the Natural History of  Destruction (1999).
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say ‘a man’ I already name the stay within the fourfold among things” (2006, 154). But it is 
increasingly clear that we, as a society, are not building for everyone as rates of  declining home 
ownership, the increasing development of  temporary housing (often in the form of  luxury con-
dominiums), and rising numbers of  evictions all attest. Our housing crisis is worse than the one 
Heidegger discusses. He is comforted, at least, by the fact that good houses are being built in 
post-war Germany, even if  they do not guarantee that dwelling occurs in them. For us, howev-
er, building, in the form of  real-estate development, and dwelling with its aspect of  belonging 
in a place for the foreseeable future, are fundamentally opposed, insofar as development always 
requires more development in service of  the generation of  capital. 
     A particularly troubling example of  such incompatibility, and indeed, of  the “gross mis-
treatment” of  which Jacobson (2010) warns, is given in the second of  the New York Times article 
series, “The Eviction Machine Churning Through New York City” (Barker et al. 2018). In the 
article, the authors detail the story of  Neri Carranza, who had lived in the same apartment on 
West 109th street since 1956. In 2010, she was facing eviction after the Orbach Group had paid 
seventy-six million for her building and most of  the nearby block. As a rent-regulated tenant, 
Ms. Carranza could not be evicted without cause, but the Orbach group hired a lawyer to evict 
her for a supposed breach of  lease. In Ms. Carranza’s case, they alleged that she had been using 
her $300 a month rent-regulated apartment as a storage space, while she lived with a friend 
nearby. She denied this and the courts ruled in her favor.9  Having tried the legal means, the Or-
bach group resorted to extra-legal means: when Ms. Carranza later asked for repairs in 2014, 
the company claimed she needed to leave for them to complete the repairs, which she did, and 
in 2016 the repairs had still not been completed. After years of  fighting, and a total of  nineteen 
court dates, Ms. Carranza decided to settle her case for $100,000, turned over her uninhabit-
able apartment to the company, and is now living with her niece in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. At 
the time the article was published, her apartment had been renovated and was being rented for 
$3,500 a month by two Columbia University students. 
     This is a clear case of  injustice, and indicates the extra-legal means that large corporations 
have at their disposal to evict their tenants and maximize their investment in the lucrative 
housing market. For some, $100,000 (though well below what the apartment is worth) and the 
prospect of  moving to another place might be perfectly acceptable. Ms. Carranza’s reaction to 
this settlement, however, points us to the heart of  the present issue: Ms. Carranza was at home 
in her Spanish-speaking neighborhood, whereas in Carlisle, Pennsylvania “there is no church 
with service in Spanish. No grocery catering to Latinos. No old friends to visit. There are not 
even any sidewalks” (Barker et al. 2018). Feeling at home, dwelling means having a place to 
serve as an anchor of  continuity throughout one’s life, and moreover, a place that is situated in 
such a way that the world around it feels welcoming, familiar, and inviting. The cynical point 
of  view that might say $100,000 is a suitable replacement for the roots she had laid down in 
her neighborhood, or even that the injustice here was that the apartment was worth more than 
what she was offered, miss the point completely. To be at home is a fundamental condition 
of  human life, and in Ms. Carranza’s case, her apartment and the life that came with it were 
viewed as secondary considerations (or more plausibly, did not even enter consideration) to 
maximizing the returns on a seventy-six million dollar investment. We might, in many ways, 
carry our habits with us, and in so doing, also carry our home with us. Indeed, Anzaldúa, de-
spite her profound apprehension in the face of  a hostile world, nevertheless claims, “in leaving 
home I did not lose touch with my origins because lo mexicano is in my system. I am a turtle, 
wherever I go I carry ‘home’ on my back” (1987, 21). We inhabit the world based on our habits, 
    
       
     9 This tactic is colloquially referred to as a “fishing expedition.” Once the corporation decides a tenant should be 
evicted, the corporation’s lawyers then search for any breach of  lease that can be feasibly argued.
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but these habits, if  we are denied a place of  our own, if  we can no longer lay down our roots 
with any sense of  security, can serve as limitations in a new context, as Ms. Carranza’s did in 
her forced move to Pennsylvania, and indeed, as so many economic migrants experience when 
they are forced to leave their country due to the global inequality of  wealth and opportunity.  
     Despite his overly sentimental and limited perspective on the problem of  dwelling, Heideg-
ger does point us in a valuable direction: for we should ask what understanding of  home is op-
erative in these domains where home is made impossible, precarious, or alienating for certain 
people. Heidegger claims that “[t]he real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search 
anew for the nature of  dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell,” and to transform the “dwelling 
plight” we must first seek out the ways in which we misunderstand dwelling so as to destroy it 
or make it impossible (2001, 159, italics in original). This is our crisis today, as more and more 
people are being dispossessed or denied the opportunity to dwell, as more and more forms of  
dwelling dissipate in the continuous and rapid world of  development for development’s sake. 
The extent of  such a crisis should provide all the more opportunity for even those of  us who 
have relatively stable housing situations, relatively stable places in our society, to reconsider our 
own place in a world that becomes less human by the day.  
III. 
THE PAST, THE FUTURE, AND “HOW MUCH” HOME WE NEED
Let us now note the qualities that define feeling at home that we have described so far: the first, 
is a sense of  security and continuity, which implies a relatively stable future; the second related 
point is that such security and continuity extend beyond the scope of  the home or shelter itself, 
into both our politics and culture. To concretize these attributes, we turn now to Heidegger’s 
ideal dwelling and the structures of  past and future that characterize it. He describes a house in 
the Black Forest, its structure designed and situated to weather the elements gracefully, but for 
our purposes, we should note that: 
. . . it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of  childbed and the 
‘tree of  the dead’—for that is what they call a coffin there: the Totenbaum—and 
in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof  the charac-
ter of  their journey through time. (2001, 158) 
A house that clears space for dwelling is one that makes room for our journey through time: not 
temporarily, but continuously, from past to future. Another way to say this might be: the house 
is not subject to some general or abstract time, but itself  mediates and makes possible certain 
experiences of  time. Heidegger understands this in a very thick generational sense, as the house 
of  our ancestors and our future children. But we do not need to go so far: we need only remem-
ber how Ms. Carannza, residing in her apartment for half  a century, had a past there, had laid 
down roots in the community, who missed seeing her old friends and attending her church. We 
also need to remember that her future there was cut short: that dwelling place, unbeknownst 
to her, did not house her future, but rather, the future of  those who, in paying 11.6 times more 
rent than her, were seen as more worthy tenants. The increasing lack of  home ownership and 
the increasingly precarious status of  housing, then, at the same time, undermine the possibility 
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of  a human future, insofar as our homes are increasingly subject to the rapid and unforeseen 
fluctuations of  the market and society at large. 
     How, then, does the past play in to the experience of  dwelling if  it need not be generational? 
In the New York Times article, Ms. Carranza revisits her unrecognizable renovated apartment 
and finds her past there, the sedimented memories and sense of  ownership destroyed as if  they 
had never happened. Jean Améry, a survivor of  the holocaust, describes a similar experience 
undergone by many Jewish people when the Nazi party relocated them from their homes and 
communities. In At the Mind’s Limits (1980), he reflects on what he and other German Jews lost 
when the Nazi party declared the Jewish people to be no longer “German.” As Améry notes, 
many merchants and artisans lost not only their goods, money, and home, but also their status 
as professionals, losing their role in their communities. Such an event not only deprives them of  
a future as professionals, but also importantly robs them of  the past as they are no longer seen 
as a part of  the “community” in which they had a place. Even more revealing is the example 
of  Alfred Mombert, a German-Jewish Neo-Romantic poet who was forcibly relocated to an 
internment camp. Mombert writes to his friend that he had lost everything, that it all flowed off 
of  him (indicative of  an experience of  temporality where things fail to cohere), and that it was 
so unthinkable that such should happen to a “German poet.” Here lies the sad contradiction 
for Améry. Mombert did not recognize that he was no longer a German poet, because 
. . . only someone who writes poetry not merely in German but also for Ger-
mans, upon their express wish, can be a German poet; that when everything 
flows off, the last traces of  the past will also be swept along. The hand that was 
not raised in his protection cast the old man out. (60) 
In the case of  the mass forced deportation of  German Jews, we can see how this works: the 
past, which had sedimented into their identities, was taken from them and forever erased, their 
place in society and the meaning of  all their past actions permanently lost. Indeed, in the case 
of  Berlin in the Third Reich, imperial boulevards and grand buildings meant to signal Germa-
ny’s glory were to be built over old Jewish neighborhoods, much as luxury condos are popping 
up today in previously underserved neighborhoods in American cities.10 If  a group of  Germans 
had fought for them, perhaps, there would be some sliver of  belonging left, some sense that 
their past as Germans meant something. Sadly, this was not the case for Alfred Mombert and 
many others like him. Happily, the New York Times article detailing so many tenants’ struggles 
constitutes some recognition that they have a place, but we must ask ourselves if  this is enough 
to safeguard some small part of  the dwelling of  the millions threatened with eviction and loss 
of  home, and all the more so when it is precisely our forms of  life, as academics, intellectuals, 
and students (the immense privilege of  Columbia University students serving a notable role in 
Ms. Carranza’s case) that make it profitable to displace such people. 
     In 1966, when he originally finished the original German text of  At the Mind’s Limits, Améry 
notes that the destruction of  worlds of  value might very well make possible a new cosmopol-
itanism, that, in having the specificity of  their homeland taken from them, the Jewish people 
     10 See Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (1970). In particular, Chapter 5, “Architectural Megalomania” (50-70). 
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might have gained the world. This is not at all convincing or comforting to him. He worries that 
in uprooting a people from their home, which lends a value to things, a change will take place: 
The objects of  daily use, which at present we still imbue with emotion, will 
be fully fungible. Already, American city planners are thinking of  turning the 
house into a consumable commodity in the future. One hears that at intervals 
of  twenty to twenty-five years entire sections of  the city will be demolished and 
rebuilt, since house repairs will be as little worthwhile as certain auto repairs 
already are. (1980, 56)
Améry’s worries here show us two things: first, that Améry, writing in Europe in 1966, believes 
this is a phenomenon on the horizon. In other words, the idea that housing is ultimately a 
replaceable commodity is a relatively new idea in the history of  the world. The house, which 
should be a space for values to inhere, which should be (on our analysis, here) a space for time, 
is made a victim of  time, made essentially temporary. If  such a world comes to pass, Améry asks: 
“how would one still be able to form the concept of  home at all?” (56). If  it is not already, then 
our world is quickly advancing in this direction. Can we still form this concept? With the help 
of  a careful phenomenological analysis, I believe we can, and even though Heidegger and 
Bachelard, established European intellectuals writing in the 1950’s, do not seem to grasp the 
true precariousness of  housing, they are right to emphasize its importance in rendering our 
worlds cohesive, stable, and in lending them a sense of  continuity. Unfortunately, forming the 
concept is not enough because home requires actual spaces, it requires activities of  building, 
and indeed, it also requires us to raise our hands in the protection of  others whose houses and 
homes are at stake. 
     If  both our enmeshment in the past and our continuity into the future are at risk, if  we 
no longer have the space to form memories, or a space that is our own to give some shape to 
our future, then we are living in a world where we treat human beings more and more, to cite 
Mombert, as if  “everything flows off,” or to use Bachelard’s phrasing, as if  we were “dispersed” 
beings, as if  we had no spatial or temporal thickness to us, as if  our lives, along with the inti-
mate and public places we live them out were mere commodities, capable of  being tossed aside 
like “old food cans,” or worse yet, as less than commodities, as the mere potential for capital 
investment (Adorno 2005, 67). And if  we do not raise our hand in protection for those who are 
dispossessed now, whose ways of  life, solitude, and daydreams are counted for nothing, we give 
too much over to an understanding of  home that treats it as an impermanent commodity, or 
even worse, one of  many ticking numbers in the rapid flow of  investment capital. 
     In spite of  this, we might say that things are hopeful: for even when it occurs minimally, even 
in spite of  everything, dwelling can and does occur. We might certainly eke out an existence 
in precarious positions, and indeed, may even find a home there. The refugee (or, increasingly, 
detainee) might decorate their tent or temporary room to their taste, and others might make 
spaces for dwelling in homes known to be temporary. As Améry’s somewhat puzzling question, 
“How much home does a person need?” teaches us, this is because “home” is something of  
which we can get more or less; it is never “complete” or “finished.” I find myself  agreeing with 
Améry that, in the face of  home becoming more and more precarious, the answer to that ques-
tion is that we need much home, indeed, as much as we can get. But what determines who gets 
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more or less home? And how do we build more together? I contend here that the first step in 
such an enterprise is to recognize what is at stake when we talk of  housing and home, and to be 
honest about the fragility and contested nature of  dwelling implicit and explicit in our forms of  
social, economic, and political organization. And if  we agree with Améry’s uncomplicated and 
earnest conclusion, that “it is not good to have no home,” we must build ourselves and others a 
different future, or rather, we must take the preliminary step of  making space for the future to 
happen in the intimate spaces of  belonging we call “home.” 
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